Introduction

Turkey's political landscape has been significantly influenced by its complex historical and socio-political dynamics, particularly in relation to the Kurdish question. Over the past 13 years, three distinct peace resolutions have been attempted, each with varying levels of success and failure. This chronological analysis explores the historical trajectory of the peace process from 2010 to 2025, focusing on recent developments initiated by the Republican People's Party (CHP). It examines key milestones, including early efforts and setbacks, the peace process from 2015 to 2023, and current efforts to revive the process—whether as a continuation or a new paradigm. Additionally, the review addresses whether Turkey is seeking to resolve the PKK issue or the broader Kurdish question. By connecting the historical context with current developments, it highlights both the opportunities and challenges that lie ahead.

From Dolmabahçe to Kobani: Early Efforts and Setbacks of the Peace Process in Turkey (2010 to 2015)

In the summer of 2009, as the influence of Turkey’s politico-military establishment waned and the Kurdish parliamentary group gained prominence, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, then Prime Minister of Turkey, formally invited Ahmet Türk, the leader of the Kurdish parliamentary group, to the government headquarters. This marked the launch of the "Democratic Opening" (Demokratik Açılım), signaling the Turkish government’s willingness to address the Kurdish question. The year 2009 was significant for advancing Erdoğan and his party, setting them apart from past Turkish rulers who often sought to control Kurds and other minorities. While Erdoğan initially pursued reforms and peace efforts, his later policies shifted towards centralization and increased state control. [21]

Although the objectives of the initiative were not entirely clear, its primary aim was to foster a parliamentary debate with the goal of implementing concrete reforms, including those addressing the Kurdish question. However, the initiative faltered due to several setbacks, two of which were particularly significant.

The first major setback occurred during the symbolic return of PKK fighters, often referred to as "peace groups" (Barış Grubu) in Turkish, from the mountains to Turkey. This event, intended to demonstrate goodwill, turned into a pro-Kurdish demonstration at the Turkish-Iraq border, which was broadcast on national television. The spectacle alarmed the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which had initiated the process, as it sparked fears of a nationalist backlash. The second setback came when the Turkish Constitutional Court, heavily influenced by secular politico-military elites, dissolved the Democratic Society Party (DTP), a key pro-Kurdish political entity. This decision effectively ended the initiative, as trust between the parties eroded, and neither side remained committed to the process.

A year after the collapse of the Democratic Opening, Erdoğan’s government, in collaboration with the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), initiated a new negotiation process away from public scrutiny. This process, known as the "Oslo Meeting" began in 2010 with a secret meeting in the Norwegian capital between representatives of the PKK and the Turkish government. The meeting was arranged at the request of the Turkish government, with Tanner Command, head of MIT, conveying a message to Jalal Talabani, then President of Iraq, asking him to mediate between Turkey and the PKK. Talabani tasked Muhammad Amin Penjweni, a Kurdish politician, with delivering the message to the PKK, leading to the Oslo talks. According to Penjweni, the PKK delegation stated during the discussions that they would accept any decision made by Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK. The meetings continued in secret until 2012, when the Fethullah Gülen movement leaked details to the public. This disclosure had a chilling effect on the process, as it exposed the government to criticism from opposition parties. Haluk Koç, Vice-President of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), declared that Erdoğan and the AKP should be tried for violating the constitution, further slowing the process. The AKP, wary of public opinion and political backlash, froze the negotiations until the end of 2012. During this period, Erdoğan hinted at the possibility of meeting Öcalan, stating in an interview with Al Jazeera, "We will continue our steps if we see a ray of light because we need to reach a result."

The Kurdish question in Turkey has long been marked by a paradox, as the government has expressed a willingness to find a peaceful solution while simultaneously implementing policies that suppress Kurdish political and cultural rights. In the end of 2012, there was a possibility of restarting the peace talks with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as an attempt to end decades of conflict. However, despite these negotiations, military operations against Kurdish groups and restrictions on pro-Kurdish political movements continued, raising doubts about the state’s true commitment to resolving the issue. (21) This contradiction highlights the challenges in balancing national security concerns with democratic reforms.

By 2013, the peace process entered a new phase under the AKP’s leadership. On March 21, 2013, a message from Abdullah Öcalan was read publicly during Newroz celebrations in Diyarbakır. In his message, Öcalan declared that a new era of peace, brotherhood, and resolution was beginning in Turkey and the Middle East. He called on PKK guerrillas to withdraw from Turkey and initiate a new phase of non-violent struggle. This marked a turning point

, as it was the first time since Öcalan’s arrest in 1999 that his message was publicly shared without interference from Turkish authorities. The reading of the message, coupled with the absence of security forces’ intervention, rekindled hopes for an end to the three-decade-long conflict that had claimed thousands of lives.

2013 marked a turning point in Turkey’s peace process, a development rooted in Erdoğan’s era, as both the government and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) engaged in negotiations. On one side, Erdoğan initiated the process, signaling a political shift towards addressing the Kurdish issue through dialogue rather than military action. On the other side, PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan accepted the initiative and called on PKK fighters to withdraw their weapons, demonstrating a willingness to pursue a peaceful resolution. However, despite initial progress, the fragile nature of the process ultimately led to its collapse in later years.

The peace, process reached a critical milestone on February 28, 2015, when a delegation from the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) met with a Turkish government delegation at the Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul. Both sides agreed to form a joint committee to finalize an agreement. The government’s delegation included Deputy Prime Minister Yalçın Akdoğan, Interior Minister Efkan Ala, AKP spokesperson Mahir Ünal, and Mehmet Dönmez, an advisor on national security. The HDP delegation, which maintained direct contact with Öcalan, included Pervin Buldan, Sırrı Süreyya Önder, and İdris Baluken. During the meeting, Önder announced that the talks had resulted in an agreement, quoting Öcalan as saying, "We seek to advance the thirty-year war towards a stable peace, and our main goal is to reach a democratic solution on the basis of common rules, abandoning armed struggle. To this end, I call on the PKK to hold an extraordinary conference in the spring." Akdoğan, in turn, emphasized the importance of disarming and pursuing democratic solutions. This historic agreement, known as the Dolmabahçe Agreement, outlined ten key points for a democratic resolution, along with two additional measures to safeguard the process.

The ten points of the Dolmabahçe Agreement included:

1. Defining and implementing democratic politics.

2. Addressing the national and local dimensions of a democratic solution.

3. Guaranteeing democratic rights and freedoms for all citizens.

4. Strengthening the relationship between democratic politics, the state, and society.

5. Addressing the social and economic dimensions of the peace process.

6. Transitioning to a solution phase that preserves democratic relations, public order, and freedoms.

7. Ensuring the rights of women, culture, and the environment.

8. Promoting democratic pluralism while respecting identity.

9. Redefining the nation, democratic republic, and common homeland in line with democratic standards.

10. Drafting a new constitution to institutionalize these changes.

The two additional measures focused on:

1. The withdrawal of PKK forces from Turkish territory.

2. Establishing the legal foundations for the peace process.

Despite the initial optimism, the peace process faced significant challenges, both internal and external, which ultimately derailed it.

Internal Challenges

Lack of Trust: The absence of trust between the PKK and the Turkish government was a major obstacle. The PKK demanded legal guarantees before withdrawing its forces, while the government insisted on disarmament as a precondition for reforms. The government’s refusal to involve third-party mediators further complicated matters, as both sides viewed the process with suspicion.
2015 Election: In 2015, a critical turning point occurred for the peace process in Turkey, as the nation approached a significant election on June 7, 2015. The election, which would determine the composition of the 25th legislative term of Turkey's parliament, became the backdrop for heightened political tensions. Both the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the opposition People's Democratic Party (HDP) began their election campaigns far earlier than initially expected. The political rhetoric from both parties grew increasingly aggressive and confrontational, significantly impacting the peace process and complicating the implementation of the Dolmabahce Agreement.

For example, on March 17, 2015, during a parliamentary group meeting, HDP co-leader Selahattin Demirtaş delivered a strongly worded message, stating: "Mr. Erdogan, you will not become president, we will not recognize you as president as long as a member of HDP breathes." This statement exemplified the deepening hostility between the two parties and the growing polarization that would further complicate any efforts to continue the peace dialogue.

As the election approached, the tensions between AKP and HDP escalated. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in turn, began to openly declare that there was no longer an agreement known as the Dolmabahce Agreement. Such statements from both sides exacerbated the political climate, creating an environment where the peace process was increasingly difficult to pursue. The inflammatory rhetoric and growing mistrust between the parties led to a significant breakdown in communication and undermined the efforts to resolve the Kurdish issue.

On June 7, 2015, Turkey held its 24th general election, a pivotal moment in the country's political history. The election was held to elect 550 members to the 25th legislative term of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. Voter participation was reported at an impressive 83.92%. The AKP led the polls with 40.8% of the votes, securing 258 seats in parliament. The Republican People's Party (CHP) gained 24.9% of the vote, winning 132 seats, while the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) also secured 24.9% of the vote, translating to 80 seats. The HDP, a pro-Kurdish party, garnered 13.1% of the vote, allowing it to secure 80 seats in parliament.

Although the AKP remained the leading party in the election, its loss of 20% of its votes compared to the 2011 election, in which it had secured 49.8%, meant that the AKP no longer held a majority in parliament. As a result, the AKP could not form a government alone and was forced to consider forming a coalition government with other parties.

Despite this, the HDP, MHP, and CHP were unable to come to an agreement on a coalition. The AKP remained the key political player in the situation, facing a dilemma: either form a coalition with another party or move toward another election. The possibility of forming a coalition with the HDP was ruled out early, as the HDP had made it clear that it would not support the AKP's leadership. Meanwhile, both the MHP and CHP were also unable to form a government alone. The CHP was open to a coalition with the HDP, but the MHP, due to ideological differences, refused to join such an arrangement.

As none of the political parties could agree on a coalition government, a snap election was called, and on November 1, 2015, Turkey held another general election. In this second round of voting, the AKP regained its majority, securing 49.5% of the votes and 317 parliamentary seats, allowing it to form a government alone.

However, the election process and the acrimonious political rhetoric leading up to it had a significant impact on the peace process. The harsh language used by both the HDP and AKP, coupled with the political fallout from the election results, made it almost impossible for the two parties to engage in meaningful dialogue. Both parties had closed off the possibility of constructive discussions, making it increasingly difficult to resume the peace process. This marked another considerable challenge to the peace efforts, as the deepened divisions between the parties, compounded by electoral tensions, created an environment that was not conducive to peace-building.

Military Escalations; In October 2015, the Revolutionary Patriotic Youth Movement (YDG-H), a PKK-affiliated group, began digging trenches and barricading neighborhoods in Sur, a district of Diyarbakır. The Turkish government responded with curfews and military operations, using heavy artillery and tanks. The clashes, which lasted until March 2016, resulted in the deaths of 265 civilians, the arrest of 10,326 individuals, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands. The destruction of Sur, including its ancient structures and UNESCO-listed sites, marked a tragic turning point in Turkey’s relationship with its Kurdish population and dealt a severe blow to the peace process.

External Challenges

In March 2011, the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was forced to withdraw its forces from the northern and eastern regions of Syria, an area known as Rojava. Shortly after this, in 2012, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) took the initiative to establish three cantons: Jazira, Afrin, and Kobani. At that time, Turkey was engaged in ongoing negotiations with the PKK, the Kurdistan Workers' Party, which influenced its stance on the developments in northern Syria. Additionally, Salih Muslim, the head of the PYD, visited Turkey several times, and during this period, Turkey did not oppose the creation of the cantons in the cross-border region.

However, the situation shifted dramatically in 2014 with the rise of ISIS. The relationship between Turkey and the PYD became strained as the PYD accused Turkey of failing to act or speak out against the ISIS attacks on Kobani. On September 2014, ISIS launched an assault on the city of Kobani, located in Rojava. Kobani held a strategic position as it lay between the Afrin and Jazira cantons, was close to the Turkish border, and had the potential to reach the shores of the Mediterranean Sea.

In the same year, Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu made a statement during an interview with Christiane Amanpour on CNN International. He said: "The sons of Kobani are brothers to us, we do not say that they are Kurds, Turks, or Arabs, but if there is an intervention in Kobani, we will say that the intervention is comprehensive for all of Syria. So, this is what I mean when I said: We will do whatever is necessary for Kobani."

Despite this strong rhetoric, Turkey remained silent during the ISIS attack on Kobani, and this silence began to significantly alter the relationship between Turkey and the PYD. The situation worsened as media outlets started to report that Turkey was turning a blind eye to the entry of ISIS fighters from abroad into Turkey and then into Syria.

The Battle of Kobani, which ended in January 2016, marked a significant turning point in the peace process. The conflict in Kobani not only deepened the divide between Turkey and the PYD but also effectively put an end to the peace process, as the growing tensions and mistrust between the parties made any further dialogue or negotiation nearly impossible.

At the onset of the Syrian crisis, both Turkey and the United States were aligned in their goal of seeing Bashar al-Assad removed from power. Turkey's vision for the post-Assad era was to replace him with a Sunni Arab-led authority, drawing inspiration from the political changes in Egypt after the fall of Mubarak and the rise of Mohamed Morsi, a key figure in the Muslim Brotherhood. As a result, Turkey began supporting Sunni Muslim factions in Syria, hoping to emulate the influence Egypt had achieved in the region. However, as the conflict continued to intensify, the U.S. grew increasingly concerned about the jihadist elements within many of the opposition groups, including ISIS and al-Qaeda. Fearing that these factions might be more harmful than Assad’s regime, the U.S. cut support for them and, by late 2014, shifted its backing toward the Democratic Union Party (PYD), a Kurdish group that it saw as a more reliable partner.

Despite U.S. concerns, Turkey persisted in providing support to the Syrian opposition. In May 2015, the Cumhuriyet newspaper published an exposé revealing that Turkey had secretly been sending weapons to these opposition groups, a claim that President Erdogan vehemently denied, dismissing it as a “spy attempt.” This report further strained relations between Turkey and the U.S., with Turkey continuing to back the Syrian Arab opposition while the U.S. maintained its support for the PYD. President Erdogan repeatedly criticized the U.S. for its assistance to the PYD, and the growing divergence in their policies on Syria led to a gradual breakdown in their bilateral relations.

The situation in Syria presented another significant challenge for Turkey's ongoing peace process with the Kurdish issue. There have been allegations that the U.S. played a role in halting the peace process in Turkey. In a January 22, 2019, article published in the Washington Post, Lee Smith claimed that the peace process was derailed by U.S. interference. He suggested that the U.S. had assured the PKK that if they withdrew from the peace talks, the U.S. would guarantee them significant gains in Syria, thus further complicating efforts for reconciliation within Turkey.

The period from 2010 to 2015 was marked by significant efforts to resolve the Kurdish question in Turkey, from the Democratic Opening to the Dolmabahçe Agreement. However, the process was plagued by internal mistrust, political polarization, and external pressures, particularly the Kobani crisis and shifting U.S.-Turkey relations. These challenges ultimately derailed the peace process, leaving a legacy of missed opportunities and renewed conflict. The lessons from this period underscore the complexity of achieving peace in a deeply divided society and the importance of trust, political will, and international cooperation in resolving protracted conflicts.

After 15 years Devlet Bahçeli extended his hand

On October 1, 2024, a significant moment in Turkey’s political history occurred when Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), extended his hand to Tuncer Bakırhan, the head of the Kurdish parliamentary group, at the beginning of the parliamentary season. This act came as a surprise, considering Bahçeli had frequently opposed the peace resolution in the past. However, Bahçeli has long been recognized as a key figure in Turkey’s political landscape, often playing a pivotal role in signaling major political and constitutional shifts, often at the behest of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). For instance, he initiated the push to lift the ban on headscarves in universities in 2008, supported the 2017 constitutional amendment that transitioned Turkey to a presidential system, called for an early election in 2018, and recently advocated for a constitutional amendment to allow President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to run for another term. Bahçeli’s actions have often marked turning points in Turkey's political journey.

In October 2024, Bahçeli’s peace initiative gained further momentum with a statement from Erdoğan, who called for a new political discourse in the country. On October 22, Bahçeli made an extraordinary move by directly inviting Abdullah Öcalan, the jailed leader of the PKK, to come to parliament and urge the PKK to abandon its armed struggle. Despite this call, the PKK continued its military operations. However, the People's Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) responded by submitting a request to meet with Öcalan, who had not been visited since 2021. On October 24, Öcalan granted permission for a DEM parliamentary member, his nephew, to visit him.

After 15 years, it seemed as though the “peace resolution” was being revived from the ashes. It was notable that this new initiative closely resembled the final stages of the previous peace resolution, as it involved visits to İmralı, the prison island where Öcalan is held, and included several individuals who had been central figures in the last peace process, such as Pervin Buldan and Sırrı Süreyya Önder. The delegation to engage with Kurdish leaders also included prominent figures like Masud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Nechirvan Barzani, president of the Kurdistan region of Iraq, Qubad Talabani, deputy prime minister of Kurdistan regional goverment, and Bafel Talabani, president of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Within Turkey, representatives from the Saadet Partisi, AKP, Gelecek Partisi, and CHP also took part in these discussions.

For a clearer understanding of the current situation and the potential for another peace resolution, two key points must be considered:

Turkey's Internal Political Landscape: Turkey has been grappling with economic crises for almost a decade, and in the May 14, 2024, general election, the AKP suffered a significant loss to the Republican People's Party (CHP). Additionally, President Erdoğan faces a political deadlock as, according to Turkey’s constitution, he cannot run for another term. Moreover, there is a possibility of redrafting the constitution of the country. In this context, reviving the peace process could help Erdoğan undermine the opposition’s grip on the Kurdish vote or even cause divisions within the CHP, where opinions on the Kurdish issue are far from unified.
Changing International Dynamics: With the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, the international context has shifted. Now, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is in power in parts of Syria, complicating Turkey’s ability to intervene in Rojava, the Kurdish-controlled region. In the past, Turkey faced fewer obstacles in its efforts to target Rojava, but the presence of HTS presents a new challenge. As a result, Ankara believes that the evolving geopolitical landscape, along with new regional developments, could encourage the PKK to enter a new phase of negotiations.

The shifting international order, marked by the Russia-Ukraine war and Europe's evolving security landscape, has reshaped regional dynamics, weakening Iran’s influence in the Middle East and altering political power structures in Lebanon. These geopolitical shifts, coupled with the potential return of Donald Trump to power, could pressure Turkey to reconsider its domestic and regional policies, including the Kurdish issue. With changing alliances and economic challenges, Ankara may seek to stabilize its internal conflicts by reviving a new peace process to strengthen its position internationally and maintain internal stability. [22].

Although the process is still in its early stages, the Kurdish side appears optimistic and anxious. They are committed to the discussions under the leadership of CHP head. The PKK confirmed receiving a letter from Öcalan, and Öcalan`s letter red for public on Mar 2, 2025. And they announced one side ceasefire. However, Turkey continues its military operations on cross border. For instance, Since Öcalan’s call for the peace process and disarmament of the PKK, Turkey has launched 14 attacks on the border regions of Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Duhok. This are all key points that mark both optimistic and anxiety of the Kurds in Turkey. [23] Additionally, Idris Baluken, a former leader of the Kurdish parliamentary group and a key figure in the 2015 peace process, argued that to,” create a new paradigm in Turkey, a new negotiation mechanism must be established”.

Conclusion

Based on past experiences, it can be said that both the domestic and international contexts are currently favorable for the emergence of a new peace resolution in Turkey to address the Kurdish question, including the PKK's issue. However, previous experiences suggest that great caution must be exercised, as the success of the process is heavily dependent on international developments, with the situation in Syria being a key factor that is still evolving. On the domestic front, events such as the hesitation of the CHP to fully commit to the process, could undermine it before it even officially begins, both legally and politically. Furthermore, it is crucial to raise an important question: Does Turkey aim to address the broader Kurdish question within the country, or is it primarily focused on resolving issues related to the PKK? These two matters require different approaches, and failing to distinguish between them could very well result in the new initiative meeting the same fate as previous attempts.

References