The Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani was among the leaders who attended the October 2025 Gaza Peace Summit in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt. His participation signaled Iraq’s endorsement of the two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, tacitly approving the 20-point peace plan proposed by U.S. President Donald Trump and, more importantly, departing from the long-held position of Iran to reject the solution. This shift comes as the country is heading towards a crucial legislative vote on November 11.
Iran and its proxies are the only actors that have opposed the two-state solution. Iraq joined the course in 2022, when the Shiite bloc passed a law that utterly criminalizes normalization with Israel. In this respect, Muqtada al-Sadr, a powerful Shiite leader and cleric who is the archrival of Iran-aligned Shiite factions of the ruling Coordination Framework (CF), denounced Sudani’s participation in the Gaza Peace Summit as a “stain of shame”. Sadr warned that this move could drift Iraq towards normalization with Israel and the acceptance of the two-state solution – which has been criminalized by the anti-normalization law. In response, the Iraqi government spokesperson Basim al-Awadi said Baghdad considers dialogue and understanding as a “means to achieve true balance in the region.”
Sudani therefore believes in achieving peace through dialogue, possibly straying Iraq away from the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance”. This view has been solidified through his “Iraq First” policy, which first surfaced in his article to Foreign Affairs and has frequently been mentioned by him as a foreign policy achievement. The policy has arguably succeeded in keeping Baghdad intact from the spillovers of the U.S.-backed Israeli attacks on Iran and its “Axis of Resistance” over the past two years as well as from Trump’s “maximum pressure campaign” against Tehran.
Sudani, Coordination Framework, and Muqtada al-Sadr
Since his departure from the former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition in 2018 and during his premiership, Sudani has cultivated significant popularity and expanded his alliance within the CF – increasingly challenging Maliki’s long-held dominance over the ruling coalition. Nevertheless, as recently stated by Maliki, it is the CF which delivers the next prime minister. Hence, Sudani has to revert back to the umbrella coalition to secure his second term of premiership.
The CF appears fragmented, with key players like Maliki, Qais al-Khazali, and Hadi al-Ameri running on separate electoral lists. Falih Fayad, the chief of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), is part of Sudani’s Development and Construction Alliance. However, this is likely a calculated tactic to maximize voter turnout from their respective bases. The CF was originally forged to counter the existential threat posed by Muqtada al-Sadr after his 2021 electoral victory. Sadr's attempt to form a "national majority government" excluding the CF ultimately failed, but he remains a potent force. Though boycotting the current election, his rhetoric focusing on militia disarmament, political reform, and state sovereignty directly challenges the CF's power-sharing model. His millions of loyal supporters can be mobilized at a moment's notice, making him a wildcard.
Although Sadr will not run for the upcoming elections, his political rhetoric primarily revolves around disarmament of militias, reform in the political apparatus, and regaining state sovereignty. These positions can be used against the CF, which is accustomed to power-sharing and institutional control. Sadr has millions of loyal supporters who can be rallied against his foes in the CF, unhesitatingly storming the streets and opening their chests to gunfire.
Paradoxically, Sadr could also be Sudani’s key to a stronger mandate. Sadr has expressed willingness to support an "alternative bloc" committed to his reform agenda. Throwing his support behind Sudani, who is perceived as a nationalist, pragmatic leader fighting corruption, would grant the Prime Minister a much larger voter base and greater leverage in post-election coalition talks. For the CF, using Sudani as a bait to engage Sadr's base is a strategic gamble to boost abysmally low predicted voter turnout. A recent survey by the Almustakilla Group for Research showed a widespread skepticism of the electoral process on behalf of the Iraqis, anticipating the turnout to range between 25 to 40 per cent, hitting the lowest since 2003.
The decision by the Iran-backed factions to run on separate lists is plausibly a calculated tactic designed to maximize votes from their respective grassroots bases while simultaneously outmaneuvering their rivals. In Shiite-majority provinces, they compete individually, but in Kurdish and Sunni areas, they project unity to strengthen their electoral presence. Many Shiites distrust political elites as corrupt and subservient to Iran; Sudani’s independent candidacy and apparent rift with Maliki, a figure closely aligned with Tehran, may reassure voters wary of undue Iranian influence. Conversely, Maliki can capitalize on his ties with Iran to present himself as a guarantor of stability, appealing to conservative Shiite voters concerned about Sudani’s independent posture.
Iran is Recalibrating
Furthermore, the CF’s electoral calculus is heavily influenced by Iran’s declining regional standing. Israel’s retaliatory strikes following the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack, including targeted assassinations of high-ranking commanders and expansion to state-level confrontations with Tehran in June, coupled with U.S.-backed operations such as Midnight Hammer, have weakened Iran’s military and nuclear capabilities. Moreover, Bashar al-Assad’s overthrow by a coalition of Sunni jihadist groups in November 2024 ended Tehran’s influence in neighboring Syria, a key strategic ally. Sudani has emerged as a credible figure capable of navigating these regional shifts, having downsized the U.S. military presence in Iraq, prevented Iraq from becoming a theater of the Iran-Israel conflict, and maintained a balanced, sovereign foreign policy in the face of the rapidly-changing regional security architecture.
Iran is in the state of recalibrating its regional posture. It cannot tighten the screws in Iraq while its regional standing is crumbling. Sudani’s participation in the Gaza Peace Summit was undoubtedly influenced by Washington, but it also carried Tehran’s implicit approval. The move was welcomed by Ammar al-Shibli, a lawmaker from Maliki’s State of Law Coalition, who argued that engagement was necessary to sustain Iraq’s diplomatic role. Shibli even suggested that Iraq should have participated alongside an Israeli delegation, remarks that contrast with Maliki’s close ties to Tehran and his reported tensions with Sudani.
Despite internal rivalries, the fundamental incentive for CF unity remains strong. Iraq’s consensus-based power-sharing system (muhasasa) grants the largest Shiite bloc the premiership. A fractured Shiite vote risks losing this pivotal prize, an outcome neither their base nor Iran will accept. The separate-lists strategy was deployed in 2021, followed by post-election consolidation; the same is expected now.
The Kurdish and Sunni Factors
Meanwhile, the Kurdish ruling factions, KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), are positioning themselves as potential kingmakers in the post-election period. The KDP and PUK, while running separately, share a unified vision for post-election negotiations. The KDP is wary of repeating its failed 2021 alliance with Sadr. Both parties remain frustrated with Sudani over the unresolved Kurdish salary crisis. In June, Hoshyar Zebari, a senior member of KDP’s political bureau, directly blamed Sudani and the CF for delaying the salaries while affirming that it will not go “without consequences.”
Sunni Arab parties and tribal leaders are steering a pragmatic course in the upcoming elections, neither firmly anchoring themselves to the CF nor completely distancing themselves from Sudani’s broader coalition calculus. For example, the Azm Alliance publicly supported Sudani’s invitation of Syrian President Ahmed al‑Sharaa, a former Al-Qaeda leader, with Azm senior figure Azzam al-Hamdani calling the move “a step toward strengthening Iraq’s regional standing,” despite objections from the CF’s hardline pro-Iran flank. A contemporary analysis confirms that the 2025 elections are likely “a recalibration of power, not a rupture of the status quo,” noting that Sudani’s cross-sectarian support base extends into Sunni-majority areas through his reconstruction record and state-centric messaging. However, it remains to be seen whether this could be translated into electoral capital for Sudani.
Conclusion
The November 11 elections are more than a test of popular will; they are a high-stakes recalibration of Iraq’s political order. Prime Minister Sudani campaigns as a pragmatic patriot who has shielded Iraq from regional storms, but his fate is tied to the divided Coordination Framework. Their apparent fragmentation is a strategic move to maximize votes before a likely post-election reunion. Sudani may gain a stronger hand if he secures the conditional support of Muqtada al-Sadr, whose reform agenda aligns with the Prime Minister’s image but threatens CF hardliners.
With Iran’s regional leverage diminished, its allied factions in Iraq have a powerful incentive to maintain unity to preserve their control of the government. Meanwhile, Kurdish and Sunni blocs will use their electoral weight as bargaining chips in the inevitable coalition talks. The outcome will define whether Sudani can continue his "Iraq First" balancing act or if he will be constrained by the very coalition system he has sought to transcend.
